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[Forthcoming in Analysis.]
Dennett and Taylor’s Alleged Refutation of
the Consequence Argument
Johan E. Gustafsson∗
Daniel C. Dennett has long maintained that the Consequence Argu-
ment for incompatibilism is confused. In a joint work with Christopher
Taylor, he claims to have shown that the argument is based on a fail-
ure to understand Logic 101. Given a fairly plausible account of having
the power to cause something, they claim that an inference rule that the
argument relies on is invalid. In this paper, I show thatDennett and Tay-
lor’s refutation does not work against a better, more standard version of
the Consequence Argument. Hence Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refuta-
tion fails.
Daniel C. Dennett has longmaintained that there’s something wrong with
the Consequence Argument. This is an argument that, if determinism is
true, no one is able to act otherwise. A very basic version runs as follows:
If determinism is true, the remote past and the laws of nature jointly
entail each one of our acts. Neither the remote past nor the laws
of nature are up to us. Therefore, if determinism is true, our acts
aren’t up to us.
In a short appendix to a joint chapter, Dennett and Christopher Taylor
argue that the Consequence Argument depends on a simple failure to
understand Logic 101. They formulate the Consequence Argument as fol-
lows, with ‘∼’, ‘&’, and ‘⊃’ representing negation, conjunction, andmaterial
implication respectively:1
1. Let ϕ be some event that actually occurs in agent A’s life (e.g.,
missing a putt). Also let P0 be a comprehensive description
of the universe’s state at some time in the remote past, and
let L be a statement of the laws of nature.
2. Then, assuming determinism, L & P0 ⊃ ϕ applies in every
possible world. Equivalently, ∼ϕ ⊃ ∼(L & P0).
∗ I would be grateful for any thoughts or comments on this paper, which can be sent
to me at johan.eric.gustafsson@gmail.com.
1 Taylor and Dennett 2011: p. 237; a very light revision of Taylor and Dennett 2002:
pp. 273–74. I have replaced their notation ‘σ0’ and ‘λ’ with the more standard ‘P0’ and ‘L’.
Moreover, I have replaced ‘∧’ and ‘⇒’ with ‘&’ and ‘⊃’.
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3. If A has the power to cause α and α ⊃ β obtains in every
possible world, then A has the power to cause β.
4. So if A has the power to cause ∼ϕ, then A has the power to
cause the falsity of either L or P0, which is absurd.
5. Therefore A lacks the power to cause ∼ϕ.
Dennett and Taylor alleged refutation of the Consequence Argument is
admirably short. Here it is in full:2
This argument illustrates nicely the confusion that causal neces-
sity and sufficiency engender. As we have argued, counterfactual
necessity is the single most crucial condition for causation, and
accordingly we would recommend that Van Inwagen’s “power to
cause” be rendered as follows:
A has the power to cause α iff for some sentence γ (describing
an action of A) and a world f close to actuality, γ & α holds
in f and α ⊃ γ in every world similar to f .
In other words, within some cluster of nearby worlds, there is a
possible action of A (called γ) that is a necessary condition for α
to occur. But under this definition, line 3 above has no warrant
whatever. Line 3 hypothesizes that α ⊃ γ in a cluster of nearby
worlds, and that α ⊃ β in every world; if we could deduce that
β ⊃ γ in this cluster, we would be home free. But of course in
Logic 101 we learn that α ⊃ γ and α ⊃ β do not entail β ⊃ γ, and so
line 3 fails, and Van Inwagen’s argument with it.
So the problem, according to Dennett and Taylor, is that line 3 is implau-
sible given a compelling account of having the power to cause something.
In the following, I shall argue that Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refuta-
tion fails.3 Note, first, that their rendition of the Consequence Argument
2 Taylor and Dennett 2011: p. 237; a revision of Taylor and Dennett 2002: p. 274.
3 Fischer (2005: pp. 429–30) claims that Dennett and Taylor’s refutation works given
their notion of having the power to cause something. But he (2005: pp. 430–31) also
argues that line 3 can be accepted given a weaker notion of having the power to cause
something, though he admits that it does not fit with our ordinary, common sense idea
of this notion. In a reply to Fischer, Dennett agrees that Fischer may have shown that
the Consequence Argument can be saved for a purely theoretical notion of causation,
but maintains that Taylor’s and his refutation still works given their ordinary sense of
causation, the one we should care about. Dennett (2005: p. 453) adds
We wouldn’t want to say farewell to something as much fun as the [Con-
sequence] Argument in an appendix would we? Well, yes.
Moreover, Taylor and Dennett (2011: pp. 236–37, 240n30) have since doubled down
on their refutation of the Consequence Argument, keeping the appendix more or less
unchanged in their revision of their chapter. I argue that their alleged refutation fails
given their own account of having the power to cause something.
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differs in some important respects from the versions defended by Peter
van Inwagen and other contemporary incompatibilists, who seem to be
the intended target.4 Contemporary versions of the Consequence Argu-
ment do not rely on a rule like the one on line 3, which has the following
form, with ‘◻’ representing logical necessity:
The Power-Transfer Rule
From ◻(α occurs ⊃ β occurs) and that some person S has the
power to cause α, deduce that S has the power to cause β.
Instead of the Power-Transfer Rule, contemporary versions depend on
transfer rules of the following general form:5
Rule Gamma
From ◻(p ⊃ q) and that person S has the power to cause some
event α such that, if S were to cause α, then p would be true, deduce
that person S has the power to cause some event β such that, if S
were to cause β, then q would be true.
Given the Power-Transfer Rule, if we have (i) that some person S has
the power to cause α, (ii) that α and β are distinct events, and (iii)
◻(α occurs ⊃ β occurs), then we can deduce that S has a further power,
namely, the power to cause β. And, given Dennett and Taylor’s account
of having the power to cause something, this needn’t follow (as they ex-
plained in the earlier quote). But, if we have (i) that some person S has the
power to cause some event α such that pwould be true if S were to cause α
and (ii) ◻(p ⊃ q), then Rule Gamma does not let us deduce that S has
any further power. We cannot deduce, for example, that S has the power
to cause p. The transfer in Rule Gamma does not transfer any powers:
We cannot rule out that α and β are the same event. Rather, Rule Gamma
only transfers what would be the case if certain abilities were exercised.
Hence this rule is consistent with Dennett and Taylor’s account of having
the power to cause something.6 Accordingly, Rule Gamma avoids their
objection to the Power-Transfer Rule.
To state Rule Gamma more compactly, we introduce an ability opera-
tor (McKay and Johnson 1996: p. 116 and Carlson 2002: p. 393):
4 Compare it with, for example, van Inwagen’s (1983: pp. 93–95) modal version.
5 See, for example, McKay and Johnson 1996: p. 119, Carlson 2000: pp. 279–80 and
van Inwagen 2013: pp. 214–15. The main difference is that the transfer rules are usually
stated in terms of unavoidability rather than ability.
6 Contrast this approach, which allows both Dennett and Taylor’s account of having
the power to cause something and the rejection of the Power-Transfer Rule, with Fischer’s
(2005: p. 430) approach, which consists in developing an alternative to Dennett and
Taylor’s account and trying to salvage the Power-Transfer Rule. Fischer’s approach is
open to Dennett’s (2005: p. 453) retort that ‘given our notion of causation, the [Con-
sequence] Argument falls apart’. Since my approach is compatible with Dennett and
Taylor’s account of having a power to cause something, it is not open to this retort.
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AWp =df Some person S has the power to cause some event α such
that, if S were to cause α, then p would be true.
Rule Gamma: From ◻(p ⊃ q) and AWp, deduce AWq.
We can defend the validity of Rule Gamma as follows: From AWp, we
have that some person S has the power to cause some event α such that p
would be true if S were to cause α. From ◻(p ⊃ q), we have that, for any
event α that S has the power to cause, p ⊃ q would be true if S were to
cause α. Hence we have that S has the power to cause some event α such
that p & (p ⊃ q) would be true if S were to cause α.7 So S has the power
to cause some event α such that q would be true if S were to cause α. So
we can conclude AWq.8
We can reconstruct Dennett and Taylor’s version of the Consequence
Argument so that it relies on Rule Gamma rather than the Power-Transfer
Rule. As before, let ϕ be an event in someone’s life. And let P be that ϕ
occurs. We can then argue as follows:9
(1) ◻((P0 & L) ⊃ P) A consequence of determinism
(2) ◻(∼P ⊃ ∼(P0 & L)) From (1) by normal modal logic
(3) AW∼P Assumption for proof by contradiction
(4) AW∼(P0 & L) From (2) and (3) by Rule Gamma
(5) ∼AW∼(P0 & L) Premise, the fixity of the past and laws
(6) ∼AW∼P From (4) and (5)
A drawback of this version of the argument (shared by Dennett and
Taylor’s version) is that it relies on the overly strong premise that no one
has the power to cause any event α such that P0 & L would be false if
they were to cause α (Finch andWarfield 1998: pp. 523–24 and Carlson
2000: pp. 279, 287). Nevertheless, the point of this reconstruction is just
to illustrate how Dennett and Taylor’s version could be amended with
a better transfer rule keeping the overall structure. This reconstructed
version does not rely on the Power-Transfer Rule. The inference rules
that this version relies on are not open to Dennett and Taylor’s objection
to the Power-Transfer Rule.
7We can conclude so if the following inference rule is valid:
Conjunction Composition: From r p and r q, deduce r p & q.
This rule is valid in Stalnaker’s (1968) and Lewis’s (1973) systems. Chellas (1975: pp. 138,
150n15) provides some further examples of systems where Conjunction Composition is
valid.
8 See Carlson 2000: pp. 286–87, for a similar defence of an analogous rule for un-
avoidability.
9 This version of the Consequence Argument is essentially the same as a version
defended by Widerker (1987: p. 41), except that this version is stated in terms of ability
rather than unavoidability.
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There are, however, more cogent versions of the Consequence Argu-
ment. These versions distinguish between two kinds of ability. In addition
to the strong ability operator, AW, we shall make use of the following
weak ability operator (McKay and Johnson 1996: p. 118):
AMp =df Some person S has the power to cause some event α such
that, if S were to cause α, then p might be true.
Consider the following inference rule for AW and AM:
Rule Delta
From (i) that person S has the power to cause some event α such
that, if S were to cause α, then p ∨ q would be true and (ii) that
person S does not have the power to cause some event β such that,
if S were to cause β, then p might be true, deduce that person S
has the power to cause some event γ such that, if S were to cause γ,
then q would be true.
Just like the transfer in Rule Gamma, the transfer in Rule Delta does not
transfer any powers, since we can’t rule out that α and γ are the same event.
And—just like Rule Gamma—Rule Delta only transfers what would be
the case if certain abilities were exercised. Accordingly, Rule Delta also
avoids Dennett and Taylor’s objection to the Power-Transfer Rule.
With the help of the two ability operators, we can state Rule Delta
more compactly:
Rule Delta: From AW(p ∨ q) and ∼AMp, deduce AWq.
The validity of Rule Delta can be defended as follows: From AW(p ∨ q),
we have that some person S has the power to cause some event α such
that p ∨ q would be true if S were to cause α. From ∼AMp, we have that
S does not have the power to cause some event α such that pmight be
true if S were to cause α. So, for any event α that S has the power to cause,
∼p would be true if S were to cause α.10 Hence S has the power to cause
some event α such that (p∨ q) & ∼p would be true if S were to cause α.11
So S has the power to cause some event α such that q would be true if S
were to cause α. So we can conclude AWq.
Now, let P0 be a proposition describing the universe’s complete state
at some time in the remote past before there were people. And let L be
the conjunction of the laws of nature into a single proposition. Given the
above transfer rules, we only need the following fixity premises:
10 We can conclude so given the right-to-le direction of Lewis’s (1973: p. 21) duality
definition of ‘might’ counterfactuals, that is,
Duality Right-to-Le: From ∼(p ∼q), deduce p q.
We do not need the controversial le-to-right direction; see Stalnaker 1981: p. 100.
11 We can conclude so given Conjunction Composition; see note 7.
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The Strong Fixity of the Past
If P0 is a proposition describing the state of the universe at some
time in the remote past before there were people, then no one has
the power to cause some event α such that, if they were to cause α,
then P0 might be false.
The Weak Fixity of the Laws
If L is the conjunction of the laws of nature into a single proposition,
then no one has the power to cause some event α such that, if they
were to cause α, then L would be false.
The main support for the Strong Fixity of the Past is that we try to hold
the remote past fixed when we evaluate counterfactuals; so it seems that,
even if we had done otherwise, the remote past would have been just like
it actually was.12 Note, in particular, that the support for this premise isn’t
merely that it would be absurd if someone had ‘the power to cause the
falsity’ of P0.13
The main support for the Weak Fixity of the Laws is the plausibility
of some necessitarian view about laws of nature or the implausibility
of anyone being able to control the laws of nature. Again, note that the
support for this premise isn’t merely that it would be absurd if someone
had ‘the power to cause the falsity’ of L.
Once more, let ϕ be some event that actually occurs in someone’s life,
and let P be that ϕ occurs. We then argue as follows:14
(1) ◻((P0 & L) ⊃ P) A consequence of determinism
(2) ◻(∼P ⊃ (∼P0 ∨ ∼L)) From (1) by normal modal logic
(3) AW∼P Assumption for proof by contradiction
(4) AW(∼P0 ∨ ∼L) From (2) and (3) by Rule Gamma
(5) ∼AM∼P0 Premiss, the Strong Fixity of the Past
(6) AW∼L From (4) and (5) by Rule Delta
(7) ∼AW∼L Premiss, the Weak Fixity of the Laws
(8) ∼AW∼P From (6) and (7)
Note that, if someone has the power to cause ∼ϕ, then it must also hold
that, if they were to cause ∼ϕ, it would not be the case that ϕ occurs. Yet,
from (8), it follows that no one has the power to cause some event α such
12 For some variations of this argument, see Lewis 1979: pp. 461–72, Ginet 1990:
pp. 107–10, and Huemer 2000: pp. 541–44.
13 Campbell (2007: pp. 108–9) objects that it’s not necessary there was a time before
there were people. But, since there was a time before there were people, Campbell’s objec-
tion is only relevant for the Consequence Argument as an argument for incompatibilism,
not as an argument that, if determinism is true, nobody is able to act otherwise.
14 This is a variation the weak-fixity-of-the-laws version of the Consequence Argu-
ment in Gustafsson 2017: p. 710, stated in terms of ability rather than unavoidability.
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that, if they were to cause α, it would not be the case that ϕ occurs. Hence
we have that no one has the power to cause ∼ϕ, and we have shown this
without the Power-Transfer Rule or any other rule that conflicts with
Dennett and Taylor’s account of having the power to cause something.15
Therefore, Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refutation of the Consequence
Argument fails.
I wish to thank Erik Carlson, Tom Stoneham, and Christopher Taylor for valu-
able comments.
This work was supported by the Swedish foundation for humanities and social
sciences.
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